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Abstract. The conception of metaphoric process elaborated by Mary
Gerhart and Allan Russell illuminates a key mechanism often involved in
the most significant advances in science and religion. Attention to this
conceptual device provides a productive way to reframe the relationships
and dialogues between the fields. The theory has compelling implications
for reframing the understanding of theology and its task.
Keywords: analogy; bidisciplinary dialogue; fundamental theol- ogy;
metaphor; metaphoric process; religion and science; religious
epistemology; theology of disclosure.

Bidisciplinary dialogue between Mary Gerhart (religious studies)
and Allan Russell (physics) has involved them in reflection on the
creation of understanding in science and religion that has resulted in an
explanatory scheme that is remarkable on a number of counts (1984;
2001). I focus here on three contributions that I believe have the most
significance from the perspective of religious studies and theology.

Reframing Fields of Meanings
Their chief contribution is the explanatory scheme itself, which
Gerhart and Russell call “metaphoric process” (1984). It is important to
stress that their concern is to explain a key epistemic mechanism often
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involved in extraordinary advances in science and religion. They are not
proposing a comprehensive theory of metaphor, although metaphors
often are indicators of the process they seek to illuminate. It also is
important to keep in mind that they are not proposing a
comprehensive theory of discovery. Their focus is on this one specific
mechanism and its implications.
To situate this process in a broader epistemological context, they
envision our inquiries about the world and ourselves taking place in
“cognitive spaces” or “worlds of meanings.” These worlds of meanings
are made up of networks of interrelated concepts, or “fields of
meanings.” The sciences, religion, and the common sense of an epoch or
culture are examples. The concepts within these fields do not stand
directly for things themselves but for our notions of these things. The
notions are defined by their interrelation with other notions. For
example, to get some conception of house, one must have other
notions available (lumber, bricks, wall, window, roof). These other
notions are variable, as are the relations between them: not all houses
are wood or brick and have four walls. So meaning as a social, cultural,
and historical artifact “arises out of the interaction of concepts and
relations, and is expressed in the topography of the field” (Gerhart and
Russell 2001, 12). It follows that meanings (of house, atom, soul, body,
spirit, and so on) can vary significantly over time or in different cultural
and social contexts. Our worlds of meanings are made up of collections of these fields of meanings. These constitute our idea of the
way things are. Although these fields of meanings are culturally and
historically conditioned, Gerhart and Russell regard an individual’s or
community’s construal, when it is successful, as genuinely corresponding
to reality in this indirect and relative way.
Their theory proposes to explain how fundamentally new
understandings and meanings develop among those who share such
worlds of meanings. They distinguish between such uncommon
innovations, or “tectonic reformations,” in fields of meanings and either
the more routine acquisition of data or the extension of concepts that
increase what we know in a field without essentially altering our worlds
of meanings. The great majority of advances in science and religious
studies involve these more ordinary increases in knowledge. Such, for
example, is the gain in astronomy effected by the sighting of a new
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planet or a black hole. The increase of knowledge in such cases is
through an accumulative process. Such discoveries have significance for
astronomy but do not alter the field as such. The imaginative extension
of concepts that led to the hypothesis of black holes in the first place is
different. That kind of advance is achieved when analogies are made
between some thing or datum that is known (or known better in one
respect or another) and another phenomenon known less well. As a
result, the second phenomenon is better understood. Such analogical
processes add new meanings to a field and may have considerable
impact on it but still do not transform the field as such. In contrast,
Copernicus’s insistence that the sun is the center of the universe, or
Newton’s insistence that the mechanical laws of the heavens are
identical with the earth’s, created unexpected understandings that
changed fundamental notions within physics—and indeed changed how
we understand the world.
Gerhart and Russell observe that the key mechanism for
transformations such as these is the forcing of an analogy between two
meanings that, given the understandings of the day, is unwarranted. In
Copernicus’s case, for example, the affirmation that the sun is the
center conflicted with the standard account at the time that the earth is
the center. To affirm that the laws of heaven and the laws of the earth
are the same, as Newton did, also entailed forcing an affirmation that
contradicted meanings taken for granted in contemporaneous science.
But the effect of these forced affirmations, despite their apparent
unreasonableness, was to open up possibilities for understanding that
had not been available before.
What most distinguishes such uncalled-for analogies is the
disruptive effect on the fields of meaning associated with them. The
force of the analogies does not simply add new information to the
world of physics and astronomy, expanding knowledge the way the
discovery of a new planet or a new mechanical law might. Nor does it
clarify the given world of meanings, the way affirming an apt analogy
between something known and something unknown might. In Newton’s
day, for example, Galileo’s understanding of the heavens and Kepler’s
understanding of mechanics were already known. The uncalled-for
analogies had a more tectonic effect because they forced a reframing in
the until-then accepted fields of meanings. The result was reconfigured
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fields of meanings that constituted a better understanding of reality. In
that sense, the result was a new world of meanings. Moreover, such
shifts in fields of meanings typically make available a new logic and
understanding of what is reasonable. Conceptual moves are possible in
Einstein’s world that were inconceivable in Newton’s, and moves in
Newton’s world would not have made sense in Galileo’s. Each metaphoric
act has the potential to lay the groundwork for otherwise unthinkable
later moves.
This reframing of the fields of meanings is the fundamental
characteristic of the process Gerhart and Russell call metaphoric. That is
what distinguishes it from the rhetorical moves we more commonly
label analogy or metaphor, neither of which reconfigures fields of
meanings themselves or logical relations between them. To keep that
difference in mind, Gerhart and Russell distinguish between the
metaphoric, on the one hand, and metaphors and the metaphorical, on
the other. On their accounting, most metaphors are not metaphoric
because they do not create the possibility for new meaning this way by
disrupting the fields of meanings.
The first three essays in New Maps for Old (Gerhart and Russell
2001) provide an array of brief illustrations from science and religion.
The authors have analyzed several more extended illustrations: in that
book, the Bible’s identification of Yahweh (God of Exodus) with El (God
of the Fathers), and in Metaphoric Process (1984), the special theory of
relativity and the religious notion of life after death. Although it is not
one of their examples, the affirmation that “Jesus is the Messiah” is
another paradigmatic instance of the metaphoric process. Given the
images current in the eschatology of the day, affirming that God was
victorious in the crucified son of a carpenter from Nazareth was uncalled
for. In fact, most of the key eschatological images by which Jesus is
identified in the biblical Gospels have something of this metaphoric
dimension. By ordinary logic he was not a victorious king of Israel; he
was not a “Son of Man” who descended gloriously from the heavens; he
was not acknowledged by his people and did not vanquish their
enemies. To affirm that Jesus is the Messiah is to force an analogy
between him and Israel’s expressions of hope and trust in God. This
requires a different understanding of God, Israel’s hope, and Jesus.
Affirming that Jesus is the Messiah forces a thoroughgoing revision of
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the field of meanings operative in Palestinian Judaism or at least those
operative in the narrative worlds of the New Testament. It reframes the
meaning of messiah, the identity of Jesus, and the field of meanings
associated with messianic hope. This makes possible logical moves that
are otherwise un- available and lays the groundwork for later moves
otherwise unthinkable.
Six entailments of such metaphoric moves are noteworthy. First,
such acts are epistemological in nature. They are not simply rhetorical
tropes but rather are reconfigurations of the fields of meanings by which
the world is apprehended.
Second, metaphoric affirmations make real, though logically and
semantically altered, assertions. Despite their apparent
unreasonableness, forcing such analogies does not result in nonsense.
To the contrary, twisting accustomed meanings in these situations
opens up possibilities for understanding that otherwise would not be
available. On this reading, for example, Christians do intend to force the
identity between “Jesus” and “Messiah.” The logic of this move loses its
force if Jesus is not in some sense properly and literally the one
expected. I use literal here advisedly. The conception of metaphoric
process destabilizes the meaning of literal itself and warrants this
qualified use. Although reference to the literal meaning often assumes
that exact and primary meanings are univocal and constant and that
fields of meanings are stable, the metaphoric process presupposes that
meanings are dynamic and relative. In a metaphoric affirmation words
come to have new exact and primary meanings. Moreover, in the
reframed context, these meanings are semantically proper, logically
warranted, and factually the case—three further important denotations
of literal. After Thompson and Joule, heat is motion. After Einstein, it is
literally true that the speed of light is the same for all observers. For
those whose world of meanings has been transformed by the gospel,
Jesus is the Messiah.
Third, notions have such metaphoric thrust only to the extent
that they continue to force disruptions in our fields of meanings. If, as
is often the case in science, a metaphoric assertion is so effective that it
produces a permanent change in meanings, the metaphoric dimension,
as we say, dies. “The efficacy that kills the metaphors of science does
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not prevail with respect to many metaphors of religion precisely because
of our inability to see the world as religion says it is. We fail to
understand, and so the metaphor lives on” (Gerhart and Russell 2001,
29).
Fourth, reception is a crucial element in metaphoric acts. The
new meanings and logical entailments are available only to those who
are able and willing to accept the reframed field of meanings. Some will
not. For example, a historian who misses the metaphoric thrust of the
affirmation that Jesus is Messiah might legitimately conclude that the
claim is an analogical assertion—in some ways justified, in other ways
not. A biblical fundamentalist would likely disagree with the conclusion
but share the assumption of a nonmetaphoric reading. Both would
miss what I am suggesting is the affirmation’s logical significance.
Misunderstanding is possible because the same assertion can be
coherently interpreted as metaphoric, analogical, or univocally literal,
and the parties might be quite unaware of their different interpretive
assumptions.
Hence, a fifth important entailment of Gerhart and Russell’s
explanatory scheme: Metaphoric acts are not necessarily self-conscious
and frequently are unnoticed. We need not suppose that Copernicus
was aware that he was acting metaphorically or that most believers are
conscious of the metaphoric thrust of many of their central convictions.
Moreover, recognizing a move as metaphoric does not establish its
truth. For example, there is nothing in principle that precludes a nonChristian or a fundamentalist Christian from understanding what is
entailed in the attribution of a metaphoric dimension to the affirmation
“Jesus is Messiah.” But understanding the proposed explanation that the
fields of meanings have been reframed does not necessarily entail being
persuaded either that the identity claim in the New Testament is in fact
metaphoric or, if it is, that the proposed alterations in fields of
meanings truthfully illuminate the phenomenon in question. So a sixth
implication is that demonstrating that an act is metaphoric does not
prove it true.
Gerhart and Russell suggest that two broad criteria are relevant
to this issue of truth. The first is productivity or efficacy. A productive
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metaphoric act is one that results in images that are useful and
effective. The distortions created by reframing the fields of meanings
open us to new ways of imagining and describing reality. They also
speak of this criterion as the “test of increased intelligibility,” that is, a
test of whether the changes in the fields of meanings increase
intelligibility of the world—not only for ourselves but also for others
(1984, 167). Their second criterion is “onto- logical flash,” which they
describe as “a surprising experience that creates conviction (sometimes
a conviction that might be said to ‘go beyond all reason’)” (2001, 40).
For example, Copernicus made his assertion with “no definite
observational evidence whatsoever” to support it (2001, 24).
The claim that Jesus is Messiah indicates both the relevance of
these general criteria and their limitation. There can be little doubt
that this reconfiguring of the fields of meanings was a particularly
effective way for early Christians to articulate convictions entailed in
their cultic celebrations of Jesus’ significance. Moreover, this metaphoric
act constituted tenacious convictions that were at the same time
counterfactual. But it is conceivable that this productive and inspired
conceptual move was nevertheless mistaken. The criteria for making
such judgments involve fragile and tentative interpretive implications—
much more so in religion than in the natural sciences. Gerhart and
Russell of course acknowledge this. It is an issue that will bedevil any
analysis that engages questions about our fundamental convictions, in
part because any proposal will presume prior convictions about how one
assesses convictions. So, to analyze this dimension, one must move
beyond Gerhart and Russell’s formal explanatory hypothesis to engage
particular philosophical and theological construals. Noting this limit does
not undermine the explanatory power of their theory. Still, questions
about assessing the truth of metaphoric acts at a formal level need
further attention. An analysis of religious convictions elaborated by
James McClendon and James Smith, another bidisciplinary team
(Baptist theologian/atheist philosopher), may prove helpful with this.

Reframing Dialogue
Gerhart and Russell take the metaphoric process and its
reconfiguration of fields of meanings as the key to understanding the
most significant similarities between science and religion. Doing so
effectively reframes the relationships between the disciplines, for then the
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focus of dialogue is pushed beyond the respective conclusions, analyses,
and data to a more fundamental interrogation of what is going on with
the prior, deeper, defining fields of meanings in which they are situated.
In speaking here of religion (or theology) as a discipline, Gerhart
and Russell understand it broadly as “philosophical reflection upon
explicitly or implicitly religious experience and language” (2001, 158–59).
They concur with those who hold that “religion,” in this sense, “and
science are not only compatible but cooperative and complementary
fields of intellectual endeavor” (1984, xv). As we have seen, however, for
them the congruity is rooted in the disciplines’ common epistemological
structures. Both science and theology exhibit metaphoric advances that
create new worlds of meaning. Hence, both also exhibit the drive of
human understanding to push beyond its limits toward a horizon that
continues to recede (1984, 188). Science and theology both respond
and witness to such “limit experiences,” but they do so in different ways.
For the most part, the response within the “rigidly circumscribed” range
of scientific considerations is not explicit (2001, 29). A rare example of
scientific theory giving theoretical status to such limit experiences is
Gödel’s Theorem which “states that there is no way to prove that any
given mathematical system is closed” (Gerhart and Russell 1984, 176).
Theology, however, has theoretical resources for exploring experiences of
limit and transcendence. Such conceptions are developed from its
analysis of “meanings” rooted in our lived and reflective experience as
conscious beings situated in particular historical, cultural, and religious
contexts. Because the need for empirical evidence derived from
experiment and observation generally precludes, or seriously
circumscribes, investigation of such resources, scientific inquiry needs to be
complemented by theology. But theology, in attending to its realm,
necessarily foregoes the probable and predictive meanings established
through empirical observation in the sciences. “In making its turn
toward the human and away from measures of the world, theology turns
away also from this time and space independence of scientific
understandings” (Gerhart and Russell 2001, 160). Hence, theology
needs science with “its ability to give a theoretical status to our
determinate understanding of specifiable data” (1984, 167).
While Gerhart and Russell affirm the complementarity of science
and theology, they are more reserved in their judgments about what
the disciplines can directly learn from one another and about the direct
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impact on one another. This is clearly, in part, a lesson drawn from their
own experience in bidisciplinary dialogue. Particular meanings in their
respective fields are often far more subtle than even a well-informed
outsider understands. Practitioners in a discipline have a more
comprehensive and empathetic grasp of how its fields of meanings fit
together and so have a kind of connatural knowledge that enables them
to recognize when a specific application of a notion makes sense and
when it does not, or when a metaphoric move increases intelligibility
and when it is just silly. (See Gerhart and Russell 2003 for their
discussion of empathy in scientific and religious understanding.) But this
perspective is not just a result of their personal experience in
bidisciplinary dialogue. The focus on fields of meanings required by
attention to the metaphoric process reframes the focus of dialogue
between disciplines.
In that light, they suggest that the natural sciences are more
likely to affect religion by reforming the world of meanings within which
theology explores the limits of human understanding than by
presenting some particular finding that causes change in religious
doctrines or narratives (2001, 155–66). The relationship parallels that
between pure mathematics and physics. Pure mathematics does not tell
anything about the real world. This is what its purchase of axiomatic
certainty costs. As a result, advances in pure mathematics do not
necessarily have direct implications for physics. “Most likely, depending
on the branch of mathematics involved, there are no implications at all”
(2001, 158).
But that does not mean mathematics has no significant relevance:
The physicist sees new mathematics as a region in which to
prospect just as Einstein did when he needed an analytic
geometric structure for his general theory of relativity. He found
and made use of Riemann’s geometry, a development in
fundamental mathematics made fifty years earlier. . . . A more
general statement might be that new mathematics expands the
realm of the computable or otherwise analyzable relations and
that some of these relations may, at some time, turn out to be of
value to physics.” (2001, 158)
Gerhart and Russell suggest that, just as pure mathematics provides
this world of meanings having to do with the computable and
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analyzable in which physicists can prospect, the natural sciences shape
our understandings of empirical reality, particularly of what is
believable, and thus provide theology with worlds of meanings within
which to prospect. Increases in our believable world of meanings have a
significant but indirect impact on theology’s fields of meanings. Science
over the last five hundred years has vastly enlarged the scope of what is
believable, and rather than reduce the scope for theology, understood
in this way, science in fact increases it. Reframed dialogue, therefore,
does not involve point-to-point mapping between disciplines.
Theologians should “not feel constrained to make particular doctrines
compatible with particular scientific theories” (2001, 174). It is their
expectation that breakthroughs in the natural sciences will cause
changes in what it is possible to believe, in the same way that breakthroughs in mathematics have caused changes in what is analyzable.

Reframing Theology
In Gerhart and Russell’s own estimation, the chief contribution of
their bidisciplinary dialogue for religious studies has been
to provide a conceptual tool to support the expectation and
existence of novelty in theological as well as scientific traditions. .
. . When people change, what can be affirmed changes. When
people are no longer willing to say “yes, I can believe that,” their
failure of faith has less to do with natural science than with their
own experiences in the world. The need to understand both
these experiences and those of natural science makes it possible
and necessary to do new theology today. (2001, 60)
Thus, the reframing of fields of meanings and of dialogue leads
to a reframing of theology and its task. This strikes me, as a theologian,
as the most compelling implication of their explanatory scheme—
although it is more implied in their work than spelled out. To the extent
that theological “meanings” are metaphoric, theological investigation
must be attentive to the interpretive effects of this process.
The degree to which theological meanings are in fact metaphoric,
however, is itself a substantive theological issue. If it is granted that at
least some theological meanings are metaphoric, pressing questions
arise about which are metaphoric. Given the inescapable pluralism of
our situation today and the apparent conflicts among the multiplicity
of convictional traditions and within them, there is no way to avoid
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further questions about how and whether metaphoric acts taken as true
by one group might be confirmed more generally as true by others.
Moreover, Gerhart and Russell presuppose that the concern of
religion and theology is ultimately with reality at the limits of our
experience. The thesis, however, is itself a controverted philosophical
and theological stance that requires confirmation. So too is their claim
that the metaphoric process is a powerful tool for showing how and that
this is the case. Although there are some formal epistemological
grounds for Gerhart and Russell’s explanatory scheme, I take it largely
as an a posteriori hypothesis. Does metaphoric process in fact explain
better than other available theories key aspects of religious convictions
and theological understandings? The importance of their illustrations is
the a posteriori confirmation that these provide for the theory’s
explanatory power. But this evidence, while suggestive, is limited to
brief sketches. Can close and detailed analysis show that metaphoric
process helps resolve significant theological controversies? that it explains
the conceptual moves of specific theologians? that it significantly
clarifies conceptual moves in a number of different traditions? that it
can facilitate more productive dialogue across confessional and
convictional lines? These questions effectively pose a new research
agenda. Can more extensive analysis sustain the notion of metaphoric
process as an explanatory scheme?
These questions also suggest a reframing of theology’s task. If
religious meanings are metaphoric, understanding them requires that
this dimension be explicitly disclosed. First, theology must recognize the
consequent twisting of the associated fields of meanings. Second, it
must understand how exactly the fields of meanings have been
reframed. Third, it must comprehend the logical and conceptual
implications of this reconfiguration. Finally, it must investigate the
warrants for this new understanding. Such a theology of disclosure
would seek to clarify in this way the relationship between what is
believed and what is believable. It would do so by paying more
attention to how religious meanings are used (what is done with the
meanings and by the meanings) and how these meanings are related
to the larger world of meanings before moving to discussions of the
meanings themselves in scriptural, historical, and systematic
investigations. This sort of theology of disclosure would offer an
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alternative prolegomenon to the standard appeals to fundamental
theology, natural theology, or apologetics. Gerhart and Russell do not
make this proposal themselves, but I believe that their notion of
metaphoric process implicitly calls for such a reframing of theology’s first
task.
This conception is not unprecedented. Robert Sokolowski (1982;
1994) has made a substantial case for the unique logical status of the
Christian conception of God as creator. Although he does not refer to
Gerhart and Russell’s theory or develop a notion comparable to it, his
illuminating exploration of the logical implications of what he calls the
Christian distinction implicitly illustrates a key example of the metaphoric
process operative in a Christian context. He describes his work as a
“theology of disclosure,” and it does exemplify a number of the features,
though not all, that I have in mind in using the characterization. To
some extent, then, his work can be seen as a more detailed and
comprehensive confirmation of Gerhart and Russell’s theory in one
religious context. As such, it also is an example of the reframing of
theology which I believe their theory suggests.
My own recent investigations (Masson 2001; 2003) provide some
de- tailed analysis to sustain the case for reframing theology along
these lines. An example is the controversy between Joseph Bracken
(1996; 1999) and Elizabeth Johnson (1996; 1999) over the doctrine of
providence, which had been debated in Theological Studies and
subsequently at meetings of the American Academy of Religion and the
Catholic Theological Society of America. Gerhart and Russell responded
to the discussion (2001, 167–76) in part by questioning Bracken’s and
Johnson’s appeals to scientific notions. This occasioned some of their
observations reported above. Although they argue that theologians
should be free to prospect among scientific notions, as we have seen,
they also warn that there is not—and theologians need not feel
constrained to prove—a one-to-one mapping of scientific findings and
theological doctrines. There are limits and dangers to prospecting in
foreign territory.
Mining one’s own territory—in this case, theology’s—also has its
dangers, however. The notion of metaphoric process can be helpful in
alerting us to these risks. The Johnson and Bracken discussion, for
example, was for the most part framed as a question about which of
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two metaphysics (Process or an updated Thomism) offers better
analogies for conceiving God and divine providence. But a close reading
of the debate reveals that Johnson, along with a number of
contemporary theologians inspired by Aquinas, is also making a
fundamental, but by and large implicit, metaphoric move. Framing the
question as a debate about whose analogical paradigm is more apt does
not excavate the core issue. Johnson seeks to avoid this difficulty in the
original article and in her responses to Bracken by explaining how the
analogous character of language about God war- rants her position.
Her appeal to the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being, however,
serves only to reinforce Bracken’s conviction that the crucial issue is
about the choice of metaphysical paradigms. Should we think of the
fundamental reality as “being” or as “becoming,” as substance or as
process? If Johnson is committed to Thomism, Bracken does not see
how she can avoid the pitfalls of a metaphysics that conceives reality in
terms of substance, even if the highest instantiation of reality, God, is
conceived as being-as-such and as immaterial.
Close analysis discloses that a much more fundamental dispute
is at issue, about how we know and speak of God in the first place and
about the way analogies for God apply at all. Such analysis reveals that
Bracken presumes a somewhat standard account of analogy as the
identification of realities (or meanings) which have some things in
common as well as fundamental differences. There has to be something
in common between creator and creature, Bracken reasons, or else the
analogy turns out to be an equivocation. He detects such equivocation
in Johnson’s assertion that it is a frequent misunderstanding of the
analogy to think of God and creatures as “uncreated and created
instantiations of ‘being’ which is held in common by both” (Johnson
1996, 11). Bracken does not see how this explanation can avoid
equivocation. Thomists claim that God’s essence is esse, “to be.” This
entails one of two possibilities. Either God is the primary instantiation
of being—unique perhaps as the only entity that possesses being by
nature but nevertheless the highest exemplification of being that other
realities have in lesser degree—or else the meaning of being is
completely different when applied to creator and creature. If the latter
is the case, it would mean that we can say nothing informative about
God. If the former is the case, and if being is conceived with the
analogy of sub- stance in mind, then, because of the static and
impersonal character of the analogue, all kinds of mental gymnastics
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and equivocation are required to account for genuine change and
freedom in the creator and the creature. Hence, Bracken concludes,
conceiving the basic reality as process (or becoming), even if this seems
counterintuitive at first, offers a more fruitful analogy for conceiving
God and accounting for divine providence and human freedom.
The difficulty with this standard account of analogy is that it
misses the metaphoric thrust of both Johnson’s argument and the
positions of con- temporary Thomists such as David Burrell (1979),
William Hill (1971), and Karl Rahner (1966; 1978), to whom she and
even Bracken himself appeal. This metaphoric dimension of their
understanding explains why in their reckoning there are no direct
analogies of the sort Bracken imagines between creature and creator.
The only way to speak of God is by stretching language to the limits.
The forced analogies that result from such metaphoric thinking do not
grasp the reality of God but by a twist of thought reflexively and
indirectly signify what is meant. The point is not to find apt analogies
for God but to find a different way of thinking and signifying, to find a
way of employing our analogies to signify what cannot be described—to
attend to a reality that is in principle beyond grasp. To achieve this
end, analogies are “forced” in the way Gerhart and Russell described,
and as a consequence our normal fields of meaning are reframed and a
new logic and understanding of what is reasonable becomes possible.
The standard account of analogy, however, does not adequately advert
to this shift in fields of meanings. To detect this, it is necessary to pay
attention to such theologians’ use of analogy rather than to what they
say about analogy. That is the aim of a theology of disclosure, as I
understand it: to lay out how such metaphoric analogies stretch our
language, reframe our fields of meanings, and consequently make
available conceptual moves that are otherwise unthinkable.
Take, for example, Aquinas’s assertion “God is simple.” Burrell
argues that this does not describe a feature or characteristic of God
that we can directly grasp or comprehend. It does not enable us to fit
God into the categories used to speak of every other reality. It does not
intuit some quality in God (simplicity) based on an analogy with that
same quality to a lesser degree in ourselves. Rather, when Aquinas
treats the simplicity of God, Burrell sees him asking whether God can be
located semantically the way other realities can. Is God a body? Is God
composed of matter and form, of substance and accidents? Is there
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any way in which God is composite or enters into compositeness with
other things? Burrell traces how “Aquinas monitors each possible way to
get hold of something: locating an object in space and time or saying
anything about it.” The upshot, Burrell claims, is that “God escapes our
grasp on every count” (Burrell 1979, 18– 19). In the case of every
other reality, whether physical, mental, real, or imaginary, one can
locate the thing and speak about it as a composite of matter and form,
accidents and substance, potency and act, genus and species, or form
and esse. The point of Aquinas’s discussion is to show that God
transcends this sort of description. If God is the sort of reality
Christians believe God to be, the beginning and end of all things, then
logically and grammatically God does not fit into any of these
categories. But because such categories are the only tools available in our
language and grammar for talking about realities, God included, asserting
God’s reality requires purposefully breaking the rules in a way that
indirectly displays what cannot be directly described. Hence, Burrell
urges us to watch Aquinas’s linguistic “performance,” that is to say, how
he uses language and how language works, when he affirms “God is
simple.” Even though the term simplicity is substantive and thus sounds
like a quality or description of God, Aquinas uses the term as shorthand
for denying that any substantives, at least as we know them, can apply
to God without the significant qualification just made. If God is the
beginning and end of all things, God cannot be like other things, and
the grammar we use to speak of God cannot operate the way that it
operates when we talk about such entities.
When theologians such as Burrell, Rahner, or Johnson appeal to
the “analogy” that Aquinas forced between God and to be, they are
excavating the bedrock of that grammatical difference. Burrell attempts
to clarify this unusual analogical move by analyzing the logical difference
between the act of predicating and the act of asserting. Asserting that
God is simple (saying that God is simple because God cannot be
grasped in terms of the composites that enable us to grasp other
beings) is different than predicating to God some known composite
(such as the simplicity we experience in other realities). The metaphoric
act, here, consists in insisting that asserting provides the grammatical
analogue for explaining propositions such as “God’s essence is to be” or
“God is simple,” even though these assertions look like ordinary
predications. Forcing this analogy between assertion and predication
opens up space in the available fields of meanings to speak of God
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without thereby getting God directly in our grasp. Forcing the analogy
does not add God as an object to the scheme of known objects or add
an objective description of God to our inventory of known entities.
Forcing the analogy provides us with a different way of understanding
the relation between what we intend when we use “God” and the objects
grasped through ordinary predication schemes. It leads to a very
different understanding of the kind of signification that is entailed when
we speak of God.
Likewise, the point of Rahner’s transcendental analysis is not, as is
often thought, to provide a metaphysical proof for the existence of a
transcendental object that can be known, spoken of, or described the
way we know and speak about other realities. His analysis—like Burrell’s,
but in a different philosophical idiom—calls attention to the logical
difference be- tween talk of God and talk of other realties. Rahner’s use
of such terms as “Holy Mystery,” “nameless whither,” “horizon,” and
“asymptotic goal” (for example, Rahner 1966; 1978) are meant to call
attention to this metaphoric shift in signification. Moreover,
characteristic of metaphoric signification, affirming that God is
transcendental reality effects fundamental and global changes in the
available theological and metaphysical fields of meanings.
Elsewhere I further trace such conceptual excavations and evaluate their
success (see Masson 2001; 2003). In this essay I have recalled the
general lines of their projects and underlined their difference from the
standard accounts of analogy with a more limited aim: to suggest how a
theology of disclosure fundamentally reframes such issues and thus
argues for a shift in theological agenda. The discussion between Johnson
and Bracken is at cross purposes because it is not attentive enough to
the metaphoric dimension of theological meanings. I hazard the
hypothesis that such theological confusion is not unusual and is ground
that needs to be mined.

Conclusion
The chief contribution of Gerhart and Russell in Metaphoric
Process(1984) and New Maps for Old (2001) has been to propose an
explanatory scheme that illuminates a pivotal mechanism in advances of
scientific and religious understanding. Focusing attention on the
disciplines’ common epistemological foundations relocates crossdisciplinary dialogue at a deeper level. Their theory of metaphoric
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process itself is a result of such bidisciplinary work. The second book’s
further explorations in science and religion indicate the fruitfulness of
such exchanges. Their work will make a more significant contribution if
the explanatory power of metaphoric process proves itself useful in the
clarification of specific and significant theological controversies and if it is
actually employed more generally as a conceptual tool in facilitating the
dialogues between science and religion and among religions. In that
case, metaphoric process would not only describe a way our fields of
meanings are sometimes productively and tectonically reconfigured. It
would auger something of a tectonic reframing of theology itself and of
the dialogue between science and religion.
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